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be well worth the price' 25 because it is a major step towards a rational de-
termination of choice of law questions in the field of torts.
Ronald L. Fancher
NON-RESMENT'S ACTION AGAINST FOREIGN CORPORATION WHERE CAUSE OF
ACTION AROSE IN NEW YORK
Petitioner, a Cuban national, purchased a United States currency draft
in Havana for $120,000 from the Industrial Bank of Cuba, payable at the
Colonial Trust Company in New York City. Upon presentation of the draft to
the New York bank the petitioner, Gonzalez, was denied payment, because the
nationalized Cuban bank had directed the Colonial Trust Company not to honor
the draft. Subsequently, the petitioner brought an action in the Supreme Court
of New York against the foreign bank by attaching its assets in New York.1
The Court of Appeals, applying New York law, reversed the Appellate Division,
Second Department, and held, three judges dissenting, the Supreme Court prop-
erly took jurisdiction. First, the respondent had a duty not to affirmatively inter-
fere with payment of the draft in New York, and by countermanding the order
for payment there was a cause of action established in New York. Second, the Act
of State Doctrine was not a bar to the jurisdiction of the state, Gonzalez v.
Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 12 N.Y.2d 33, 186 N.E.2d 410, 234 N.Y.S.2d
210 (1962).
Prior to World War II the state courts of the United States firmly adhered
to the Act of State Doctrine that "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory."2 After the war, however, the state courts began to re-examine the tenet
in an effort to justify the harsh and steadfast doctrine. With the deep scrutiny
there evolved a corrosion of the once absolute rule: first, it appears that the
doctrine is a self-imposed limitation of state courts, and second, even more
important to the unstabilizing effect on the doctrine, is the tendency for the
state courts to sit in judgment on acts committed by foreign nations when the
latter breach recognized rules of international law.8 In the instant case, there
being no present policy from the executive branch requiring acquiescence by
Cuba to be sued in our courts, New York was at liberty to take jurisdiction.
4
Consequently, the New York policy on such acquiescence is operative, and the
25. Reese, supra note 22, at 1254.
1. Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 285, 227 N.Y.S.2d 459
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
2. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918). See Hewitt v. Speyer, 250
Fed. 367 (2d Cir. 1918); Comment 57 Yale L.J. 108 (1947); Metzger, The Act ol State
Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 881 (1962).
3. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also,
Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 635 (1959);
Committee on International Law, Association of the Bar of City of New York, A Recon-
sideration of the Act of State Doctrine in United States Courts (May 1959).
4. 43 Dep't State Bull. 171 (1960).
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Supreme Court will adjudicate cases involving acts of foreign governments when
they breach international law.5
Notwithstanding the Act of State Doctrine, may a non-resident sue a
foreign corporation in New York State? A well established conflict of laws rule
holds that the forum state will utilize internal standards in determining whether
it may take jurisdiction.6 In the instant case N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law section
225 (3) 7 permits a non-resident to sue a foreign corporation in the state, "where
the cause of action arose within the state." If by refusing to honor the draft
payable in New York a cause of action arose in the state, then the Supreme
Court was warranted in exercising jurisdiction under the statute.
8
According to New York law a cause of action arises when there is, a breach
of contract within the territorial borders of the state.9 Furthermore the
situs of the cause of action is almost universally the jurisdiction where the con-
tract is to be performed.' 0 Judge Danforth clearly enunciated the often quoted
rule of jurisdiction for bills and notes that "the cause of action arises when
that is not done which ought to have been done; or that is done which ought not
to have been done .... [T] he place where it occurs is the place where the cause
of action arises."" Therefore when a contract, including a negotiable instrument,
is made in another state or territory, but payable in New York, the place fixed
for performance is the place where the cause of action arises.' 2
In reversing the lower court, four to three, the majority held that the Su-
preme Court could exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter. They de-
termined that under N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law section 225(3) a non-resident could
sue a foreign corporation in our courts if there was sufficient contact with the
state. The Court of Appeals then logically applied the essential element by
holding that a cause of action arose in New York when the draft was not
honored at the designated place of performance in New York City. In the
words of the court "the countermand of payment issued to Colonial in New
York constituted a wrong and breach of contract committed by Industrial in
New York."' 3 The majority then, without apparent difficulty, ruled that in the
absence of a contrary directive by the State Department the Act of State
Doctrine was no bar to New York taking jurisdiction. Despite the sound rea-
soning of the court, Judges Foster and Van Voorhis argued that the drawer of
a draft only contracts to reimburse the holder at the place where the instrument
5. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v Bank of New York, 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939).
6. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
7. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 225(3) (1929) (now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1314(3)).
8. L. B. Foster Inc. v. Koppel Indust. Car & Equip. Co., 127 Misc. 51, 215 N.Y. Supp.
214 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
9. Walker v. Bank of New York, 9 N.Y. 582 (1854).
10. Wester v. Casein Co. of America, 206 N.Y. 506, 100 N.E. 488 (1912).
11. Hibernia Natl Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N.Y. 367, 384 (1881).
12. Ibid.; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 163, 124 N.E.2d 99, 106 (1954); Emmons v.
McFaul, 195 Misc. 276, 89 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Munic. Ct. of Syracuse 1949). Cf., Restatement
(Second), Conffict of Laws § 370 (1958), stating that "the law of the place of performance
determines whether a breach of contract has occurred."
13. Instant case at 37, 186 N.E.2d at 414, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
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is made.1 4 Thus they contended the situs of the draft, Cuba, is the place of the
cause of action and not New York. This argument would negative the right
of the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction. In view of the cases relied upon,
however, it appears as though the dissent confused two separate and distinct
issues; i.e., the difference between the jurisdictional right and/or power to
hear a case, and the choice of law to be applied by the forum state.Y5
Judge Fuld, however, raised a very interesting question when he affirmed
the jurisdictional points, but dissented in contending that the case must be
remanded to determine which law should apply, New York or Cuban. The
majority completely ignored this conflict of laws issue in its application of
New York law. Perhaps this was incorrect in light of a statement by Justice
Cardozo on negotiable instruments in this area, "that conflict of laws has been
more remorseless. . . , more blind to final causes, than it has been in other
fields."' 6 This observation is particularly true in New York where the choice
of law to be applied for negotiable instruments defies logic, and for this reason
Judge Fuld's disagreement is basically sound.lT It does appear that the majority
without due consideration correctly chose to apply New York law, but neverthe-
less the question definitely warranted consideration in the opinion.
Not only are the legal merits of the court's reasoning sound in holding that
New York properly accepted jurisdiction, but as a practical matter the decision
is vital for the protection of all persons who suffer inequities from pernicious
nations such as Castro's Cuba. Still law is more than logic and fair play. It is
also the stabilizer of our society which necessarily relies upon court decisions
and precedents to develop the framework for orderly community living. For
this reason, after deciding in favor of New York jurisdiction, the court should
have discussed and clarified the choice of law dilemma. But even with this pos-
sible weakness in the decision the court did firmly establish that non-residents
may seek the protection of our courts when there is a cause of action in New
York. Furthermore, there is a cause of action when a contract, in this case a
draft payable in New York, is countermanded at the intended place of
performance.
Thomas E. Webb
14. Id. at 37, 186 N.E.2d at 416, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
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16. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 68 (1928).
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